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ABSTRACT 
At the core of the human being is a longing to live a meaningful and integrated life.  In an 
effort to understand what the integrated life entails, this thesis compares theological, legal, and 
spiritual sources in order to understand the practical human faculty known as the conscience.  
The interdisciplinary dialogue is significant because it takes into account the multiple facets of 
conscience and how it relates to decision-making.  The comparison between these different 
sources reveals the necessary balancing between an individual’s internal and external worlds.  
This thesis also demonstrates the inherent relationality of the human being and the importance of 
an individual’s membership in his or her communities.  Although the journey towards a holistic 
and integrated life is complex, this thesis frames the important questions relating to the 
conscience so that an individual can seriously work towards living a holistic and integrated life. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Living a life of integrity is the deep-rooted hope of all human beings.  The means to 
learning about how to live a life of integrity is through the conscience.  In order to maintain a life 
of integrity, one must exercise the dictates that one hears from his or her conscience and 
maintain them within the public sphere.  This life of integrity requires that one’s thoughts and 
beliefs are integrated with one’s actions.  Prior to answering the question of how to exercise 
conscience in the public sphere, it is first necessary to define the meaning of conscience.  The 
difficulty in defining conscience stems from the multidimensional nature of conscience.  Within 
the study of theology, the concept of conscience is understood and interpreted through not only 
moral theology, but also spirituality and ecclesiology.  Conscience also touches disciplines 
outside the study of theology, as it is integral to the discussion of political freedom, 
psychological analysis, and general ethics.  While conscience can be seen from many 
disciplinary lenses, this interdisciplinary research thesis will examine the theological, legal, and 
spiritual dimensions of conscience to understand how a person can exercise his or her conscience 
within the public sphere. 
An inquiry into the definition of conscience is significant because conscience is intrinsic 
to all human beings, and not limited to Catholic Christians.  I explore the definition of 
conscience from a Catholic viewpoint because of the ontological priority the Catholic Church 
gives to this intrinsic faculty.  The Second Vatican Council’s pastoral constitution Gaudium et 
Spes defines the private and sacred nature of conscience: 
For they have in their hearts a law inscribed by God.  Their dignity rests in 
observing this law, and by it they will be judged.  Their conscience is people’s 
most secret core, and their sanctuary.  There they are alone with God whose voice 
echoes in their depths.”i 
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Every person has a conscience by virtue of his or her humanity.  In this most secret core and 
sanctuary of the human person, God directs a human being towards one action over another.  
Although everyone possesses this faculty, each conscience is unique; this uniqueness is what has 
created a lack of consensus over the definition of conscience. 
However, despite the great significance of conscience for all human beings, conscience, 
for various reasons, is oversimplified and misunderstood.  The conscience is often referenced in 
the media as an extrinsic, practical voice that prevents an individual person from living a 
carefree, enjoyable life.  In addition to the extrinsic nature attributed to conscience, the definition 
of conscience often conflates religion and belief; as a result, it is viewed as a private, individual 
function.  The view of conscience as part of a common, public life is a radical departure from the 
privatization conscience receives today.  This compartmentalization remains problematic 
because in order to live life with integrity and wholeness, the mandates of one’s conscience must 
be integrated into every facet of a human person’s life, including the human’s life in the public 
sphere. 
In order to represent fully the holistic nature of the human person, I employ a method 
involving sources from moral theology, jurisprudence, and spirituality.  Consistent with my view 
that living a life of integrity is the hope of all human beings, I approach this topic from a holistic 
perspective so that I do not undermine my efforts at integration.  While this research aims to 
deconstruct the different realms in which a human being operates, the ultimate goal is toward 
integration.   
My starting point will be anthropological, consistent with Karl Rahner’s transcendental 
theology.  Using the human subject as the starting point, I then look at the extrinsic sources that 
influence a human being’s conscience.  From a Catholic moral theological view, the human 
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subject is influenced by the subject’s relationship privately with God and publicly with his or her 
membership in various communities.  While I make these distinctions between private and 
public, I offer these distinctions as an effort to organize a richer understanding of conscience.  In 
examining the public dimensions of conscience, I explore the American political landscape and 
the prevailing theory of liberalism.  As a possible solution to the problems created by the liberal 
political climate, I offer Robert Vischer’s solution of using the mediating function of institutions 
to help illuminate the meaning of conscience.  Finally, after exploring the dimensions of a human 
subject’s private and public relationships, I offer Ignatian spirituality and discernment as a 
practical system to navigate between the conscience’s private and public relationships. 
In the first chapter, I employ Karl Rahner’s anthropological starting point in order to 
utilize his transcendental method.ii  By starting anthropologically, I am able to focus on the 
human person, which is the primary reason for this inquiry on conscience.  Because Karl 
Rahner’s theology placed its main focus on the individual subject rather than focusing on the 
object, his systematic theology remains relevant for my inquiries.  Rahner overcomes the 
extrincism of Neo-Scholastic theology by introducing an anthropological starting point.  A 
transcendental method of inquiry would be the most effective way to enter into a dialogue with 
the current issues of integrity because it situates the human person holistically and existentially 
equipped with this communication with God through the conscience. 
Rahner approaches the human subject as having an a priori openness to the transcendent, 
which he coins as preapprehension or Vorgriff.iii  He also introduces the concept of the 
supernatural existential, a view that all human beings are ontologically gifted with God’s grace.iv  
Because all human beings are existentially composed with this supernatural grace, in Rahner’s 
theology it follows that the world itself is also graced.v  Rahner’s view of the world as graced has 
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great implications in the concrete world.  His systematic theology has the serious Christian 
asking: what is the function of the human person within this pluralistic reality? 
After employing Rahner’s systematic methods are employed, I explore the current 
scholarship on the theological inquiry into formation of conscience.  Gaudium et Spes resonates 
with Rahner’s theology in that conscience is situated within an anthropological starting point.  
Linda Hogan, in her book Confronting the Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition, offers 
the historical progression of conscience and the theological problems conscience poses today.vi  
Hogan argues for a shift to a personalist view of conscience, consistent with the spirit of the 
Second Vatican Council.vii  Rahner, Gaudium et Spes, and Hogan are important for the question 
of integrity and conscience because they equip us with a method to approach the question of 
conscience within the American public sphere. 
In the second chapter, I address the forum in which the human person can exercise the 
intrinsic faculty of the conscience, given the attributes of the human person.  Living a life of 
integrity requires not only that one be in touch with his or her conscience, but also that one 
expresses the dictates of his or her conscience within the public sphere.  The United States 
government recognizes this intrinsic voice known as the conscience and protects its liberty 
through the Constitution, statutes, and court decisions.  Despite its respect for conscience, even 
the American legal system does not truly understand the full power and meaning of conscience 
because of its liberal approach to rights divorced from duties.  Part of my inquiry aims to 
understand what this current climate of privatization of conscience means for the moral subject 
and how one can promote the freedom of conscience through deliberate practice of the dictates 
of his or her conscience.  I engage the recent work of Robert Vischer on the intersection of 
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conscience and the common good in order to find a possible solution to the problems that the 
discussion of conscience encounters in the American public sphere. 
Vischer’s work deals with the treatment of conscience in the American public sphere.viii  
To Vischer, voluntary associations mediate the tension between the individual and the state.ix  
His work is helpful because it brings to light the importance of mediating bodies, such as 
voluntary associations, in the exercise of conscience.  While my starting point is with the 
individual moral subject, Vischer’s tendency is to move away from the subject in order to 
understand the subject in relation to its necessary relationships.  While my individualist approach 
seems contrary to Vischer’s argument, in my perspective, my analysis complements Vischer’s 
legal thought into a more integrated whole.  I would highlight the importance of the moral 
subject as a participant in the public sphere because of the necessity of connecting conscience to 
action.  In light of Vischer’s view of voluntary associations functioning to mediate tensions 
between the state and individual, my proposal focuses on how the individual should approach the 
exercise of conscience in light of these associations.  In this chapter, my argument focuses on the 
necessity of associating with a larger group in order to not only exercise one’s conscience but 
also to form and understand what one believes. 
To Vischer, conscience has a relational dimension; that is, conscience is formed within 
the communities of which the individual is a member.x  Vischer favors a “bottom-up” approach, 
in which the individual is the driver of the associations or institutions that mediate his or her 
conscience to the state.  Consistent with Vischer’s assertion that conscience is dependent upon 
action, I argue that to be truly in touch with one’s conscience and to maintain integrity within 
one’s life, one must be able to discern clearly choices within their own moral framework.  
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Vischer’s model is the most effective solution to the current conscience problems, in light of the 
liberalism that dictates American political thought. 
Finally, in the third chapter, I propose an integrated way of decision-making in light of 
the intrinsic and extrinsic forces that lead to conscience formation.  First, I establish why 
Ignatian spirituality is instructive in our analysis of conscience.  I set out to argue that Ignatian 
Spirituality has fruits of wisdom rooted in a deep understanding of the human being that can be 
beneficial for all people.  It takes into account the holistic nature of the human being: the 
physical, mental, socio-emotional, and spiritual aspects are all utilized in the decision-making 
process.  Next, in order to understand the personal dimension involved in Ignatian Spirituality, I 
describe the Ignatian concepts of contemplation and discernment.  In addition to using the 
Spiritual Exercises, I employ the work of Ignatian spirituality experts such as Adolfo Nicolas, SJ, 
Monika Hellwig, David Lonsdale, and Walter Burghardt, SJ in order to gain an understanding of 
Ignatian concepts suitable for the contemporary period. 
Ignatian spirituality is also useful for understanding the relational dimension of the 
conscience.  Finally, I will explore the concept of the “contemplative in action” as a vehicle for 
understanding the relational conscience.    My primary interlocutors for Ignatian spirituality and 
the relational dimension of conscience include Wilkie Au and Michael Cooper, SJ.  Although it 
seems counterintuitive, I demonstrate that the focus on the personal dimension conscience is 
important in moving towards the relational dimension. 
The synthesis of these theological, legal, and spiritual voices is significant because it 
enables one to understand and integrate the multiple dimensions of conscience.  As an attorney, 
instructor, and theologian, I encounter my clients’ and students’ daily struggle to do just that.  
The prevailing question is often, “what should I do?”  While that question is very simple, the 
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answer is very complex.  The answer is not the same for everyone; the answer depends on 
multiple factors, including who the individual is, the individual’s context, the communities and 
institutions the individuals is a part of, and universal and communal norms of society. 
The significance underlying this synthetic work is its systematic approach, rooted in 
wisdom from theological, legal, and spiritual sources, which one can use to answer “what should 
I do?”  The primary concern in any decision-making question is whether the decision maintains 
integrated with an individual’s conscience.  In addition, by virtue of asking the question “what 
should I do?” to another person, it showcases the relational dimension of the conscience and 
decision-making. 
Given the purpose, method and approach, and significance of this research thesis, it is 
integral to keep in mind the centrality of the human person in this analysis not as an end in his or 
herself, but as a vehicle to God.  It is my hope that in learning more about the human person, one 
realizes that the ultimate trajectory of the human mind, body, and soul is towards God. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Anthropological Methodology of Conscience 
 
In this chapter, I examine the progression of Catholic moral theological thought on 
conscience.  The Catholic view of the human being was traditionally compartmentalized, 
accounting for certain aspects of human behavior rather than holistically viewing the human 
being.  A survey of the theology of Karl Rahner, the Second Vatican Council’s pastoral 
constitution, Gaudium et Spes, and Linda Hogan reveals a more holistic view of moral theology 
necessary to understand an anthropologically-centered definition of conscience.  The aim of this 
chapter is to establish a definition of conscience that seriously considers the multiple factors 
surrounding an individual and the decisions the individual makes. 
I. The Transcendental Method of Karl Rahner 
Karl Rahner, in Foundations of Christian Faith: an Introduction to the Idea of 
Christianity, introduces a method of inquiry starting from the human person.  Rahner’s 
anthropological starting point stands in sharp contrast to Neo-Scholastic theology, which focuses 
on the extrinsic reality of God as the starting point.  He builds on the philosophies of Kant, 
Hegel, and Heidegger and shifts the locus of theology from an extrinsic starting point to one 
centered on the human being.xi  In his first chapter, he highlights the importance of 
understanding philosophy and theology together, because philosophy is the way towards gaining 
insight about the human person.  In contrast to the extrincism of Neo-Scholasticism, Rahner’s 
speculative theology centers on anthropological return to the subject: he understands the subject 
of the message prior to discussing the message itself.xii  Rahner starts with the intended hearer of 
the message in order to better understand where the message is coming from.xiii  To comprehend 
fully the impact of Rahner’s theology on moral theology generally and conscience in particular, 
it is necessary to examine the following: first, what Rahner believes are the conditions that make 
9 
 
it possible to allow the human being to hear the message of God; second, Rahner’s concept of the 
supernatural existential; and finally, how Rahner’s thought influenced the Second Vatican 
Council’s pastoral constitution, Gaudium et Spes. 
Conditions of Possibility 
After starting with the question of who the human being is, Rahner transitions to 
determining what human conditions make it possible for the human being to hear God’s 
message; in other words, what is intrinsic to the human being that allows the human being to 
hear the call of God?  Rahner answers that question by establishing that the human being is 
person and subject, transcendent, responsible and free, historically conditioned, and dependent. 
In explaining these conditions of possibility, Rahner introduces his idea of Vorgriff, an a 
priori openness to the transcendent.xiv  In introducing this concept, he carefully balances the 
understanding that the human is a being in between: the human being is both categorical and 
transcendent.  Although the human being is between these two places, the human is not static.  
This self-transcendence is characterized by a movement toward the infinite horizon of being.  
“Being situated in this way between the finite and infinite is what constitutes man, and is shown 
by the fact that it is in his infinite transcendence and in his freedom that man experiences himself 
as dependent and historically conditioned.”xv  In other words, Vorgriff is a condition of 
possibility that allows the human being to transcend the categorical and move towards God.  To 
Rahner, the ultimate meaning of subjectivity is that one is open to transcendence because of the 
pre-apprehension or Vorgriffxvi.  With Vorgriff, Rahner establishes the dependence of human 
beings upon God; it also situates the human being’s historical situation within the categorical 
realm. 
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The role of grace through the movement of transcendentality is “a relationship which 
does not establish itself by its own power, but is experienced as something which was established 
and is at the disposal of another, and which is grounded in the abyss of ineffable mystery.”xvii  
The human subject is dependent upon God for the a priori grace of transcendence, as well as any 
a posteriori grace.  A priori and a posteriori are epistemological ways of looking at a subject.  An 
a priori view will look at conditions prior to any human experience; in contrast, a posteriori looks 
at conditions after an experience has occurred. 
In discussing conditions of possibility, Rahner offers a method for understanding the 
relationship between true freedom and responsibility: as dependence upon God increases, 
freedom proportionately increases.xviii  “He comes to the real truth about himself precisely by the 
fact that he patiently endures and accepts this knowledge that his own reality is not in his own 
hands.”xix  Only through recognition of the human being’s dependence upon God is a human 
being truly free.  A transcendental trajectory towards God is the only way that a human being can 
be free because it is the way a human being can understand his or her limited nature and assume 
responsibility based on that limitedness.xx  Thus, a proper understanding of the human being 
leads the limited human being to a proper understanding of the human in relation to an unlimited 
God. 
Rahner’s survey of the conditions that make it possible to recognize God’s 
communication remain important for the discussion on conscience because these conditions 
make it possible for human beings, regardless of experience, location, or other limiting factors to 
hear the dictates of his or her conscience.  In turn, the discussion of conscience remains 
important because conscience is where the movement of action in the world begins. 
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Supernatural Existential 
In Rahner’s theology, the innermost understanding of Christian existence can be 
expressed in the following statement: the human is the event of a free, unmerited and forgiving, 
and absolute self-communication of God.xxi  Rahner’s concept of the supernatural existential 
situates human beings as ontologically equipped with the gift to hear God’s communication.  In 
other words, human nature is already filled at the level of grace, or the supernatural, at the level 
of creation.  The human being is existentially constituted to prepare for this event of God’s self-
communication.  In contrast to the Neo-scholastic theology that separated the natural and 
supernatural in order to protect the gratuitous nature of grace, the theology of the supernatural 
existential eliminates need for that separation.  Rahner accounts for the unmerited dimension of 
grace by making it a condition of the human being; the free self-communication of God remains 
a gift to the subject who is constituted by God to recognize and respond to this gift. 
While Rahner’s theology of the supernatural existential seems to assert that all human 
beings are graced without taking into consideration the problem of evil, Rahner accounts for 
human freedom by leaving the human subject the freedom to accept or reject God’s offer of 
grace.  God’s offer requires a response from the human person’s free will; the human person is 
then free to accept or reject God’s offer of grace as a fundamental option.  With the supernatural 
existential, Rahner establishes creation’s intrinsic goodness.  Humans remain dependent upon 
God for God’s self-communication but are free to either reject or accept their dependence upon 
God. 
Although Rahner’s theology is systematic in nature, his anthropological starting point 
contributes to the importance of experience in moral theology.  As we will later see when we 
discuss the different parts of conscience, human disposition and human freedom are crucial in 
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understanding the distinction between synderesis and conscientia.  Rahner’s theology also 
accounts for the existential dimensions of all human beings, creating a highly humanistic 
theology that later influences the reforms of the Second Vatican Council.  William Dych 
explains that “[t]here is no doubt that by the time the Council ended in December 1965 Rahner 
had exercised enormous influence on the final shape of many of the conciliar documents.”xxii  
One of those documents that Rahner particularly influences is the Second Vatican Council’s 
document dealing with conscience, Gaudium et Spes. 
Gaudium et Spes 
In light of Rahner’s transcendental theology and modern view of the human being, the 
Catholic Church experienced a renewal through the Second Vatican Council.  Written in 1965, 
Gaudium et Spes, the Second Vatican Council’s pastoral constitution, “is a landmark document 
for the shift from ‘nature’ to ‘person’ in an official [Catholic] Church document.”xxiii  Richard 
Gula views Gaudium et Spes as a historically conscious, empirically oriented, personally focused 
document that focuses not on human nature, but on the human person.xxiv  An examination of 
Linda Hogan’s thought in the next section will reveal the impact of the Gaudium et Spes on the 
meaning and dignity of conscience. 
Gaudium et Spes defines the nature of conscience: 
Deep within their consciences men and women discover a law which they have 
not laid upon themselves and which they must obey.  Its voice, ever calling them 
to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, tells them inwardly at the right 
moment: do this, shun that.  For they have in their hearts a law inscribed by God.  
Their dignity rests in observing this law, and by it they will be judged.  Their 
conscience is people’s most secret core, and their sanctuary.  There they are alone 
with God whose voice echoes in their depths.  Through loyalty to conscience, 
Christians are joined to others in the search for truth and for the right solution to 
so many moral problems which arise both in the life of individuals and from 
social relationships.  Hence, the more a correct conscience prevails, the more do 
persons and groups turn aside from blind choice and endeavor to conform to the 
objective standards of moral conduct….xxv 
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Gaudium et Spes presents an existential and intrinsic understanding of conscience, consistent 
with Rahner’s anthropological starting point and the concepts of Vorgriff and the supernatural 
existential.  While Gaudium et Spes gave in 1965 an anthropological and subjective definition of 
conscience in light of Rahner’s transcendental theology, this definition continues to require 
further interpretation. 
II. Personalism and Conscience 
 
While Rahner’s Foundations of Christian Faith laid the framework for a modern 
theology based on the human person and Rahner’s transcendental theology greatly influenced the 
spirit of the Second Vatican Council, the Catholic Church is still adjusting to the new and broad 
understanding of conscience.  In an attempt to deal with the problems in contemporary moral 
theology in light of Rahner’s transcendental method, Linda Hogan, in her book Confronting the 
Truth: Conscience in the Catholic Tradition, documents the historical progression of conscience 
and reinterprets the spirit of the Second Vatican Council in order to reconcile the ambiguities 
that give rise to current problems. 
Hogan discusses the modern debates surrounding conscience in the Catholic Church by 
distinguishing two schools of thought: “[o]ne is clustered around John Finnis and Germain 
Grisez,” and “the other around McCormick, Charles Curran and Josef Fuchs.”xxvi  She recognizes 
the common question that unites both schools of thought, the question of where ultimate moral 
responsibility and authority resides.xxvii  She suggests that the reason for these two schools of 
thought is due to the Catholic Church’s “failure to confront its own ambiguities in its own 
understanding of conscience.”xxviii  Hogan argues for a return to the personalist theology of the 
Second Vatican Council to provide a starting point for the interpretation of conscience.xxix 
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Hogan’s thought is important for understanding the individual conscience in light of the 
theology of Gaudium et Spes because it prepares for the upcoming discussion on the relational 
conscience.  In order to understand Hogan’s thought on conscience, this section 1) examines the 
paradigm shifts in moral theology, 2) distinguishes between two types of conscience: synderesis 
and conscientia, and 3) highlights decision-making in light of a personalist theology. 
Paradigm Shifts in Moral Theology 
 
Hogan examines the extent of the paradigm shift from the manualist tradition to the 
humanistic paradigm of the Second Vatican Council.xxx  She identifies the new paradigm as “a 
personalist paradigm.”xxxi  Hogan explores conscience today within the context of this personalist 
paradigm and notes that the current conflicts of paradigms coincide with the old issues of 
institutional versus personal moral authority.xxxii  Hogan attributes this paradigm shift to three 
developments: 1) the introduction of historical consciousness into theological reflection; 2) the 
resistance to neo-Thomism; and 3) the controversy surrounding situation ethics debates.xxxiii  
Hogan believes that Karl Rahner was one of the major thinkers who influenced the three 
developments. 
To Hogan, Gaudium et Spes is an example of the personalist paradigm that “describes the 
Christian moral demand as a personal response to the divine initiative in salvation.  The free 
response to this invitation is the basis of the new morality and requires a reorientation of heart 
and mind.”xxxiv  Consistent with the anthropological starting point and conditions of possibility 
set forth by Rahner, Hogan highlights that “[t]he consequence of framing morality…was that the 
person moved center stage….Gaudium et Spes puts forward a model of morality in which the 
person is the source of ethical discernment and action.”xxxv   Hogan concludes that “[i]t involves 
a radical departure from the previous theology because it commits us to an entirely different way 
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of assessing the morality of human actions.  In practical terms it means that each action must be 
evaluated in the context of the person considered holistically, that is, in light of the person’s 
circumstances and relationships.xxxvi Her holistic and integrative method of looking at the 
individual conscience is helpful at understanding the definition of conscience set forth in 
Gaudium et Spes.  While Hogan briefly alludes to the relational conscience, the theories of 
relational conscience set forth by Pope Benedict XI and Robert Vischer will be discussed in 
greater depth in chapter two. 
Comparing Synderesis and Conscientia 
After reframing the conscience in light of the personalism of the Second Vatican Council, 
Hogan proposes reexamining the relationship between synderesis and conscientia.xxxvii  In 
referring to synderesis, Hogan views it as a habitual conscience which is the innate sense of good 
and evil.xxxviii  This fundamental orientation to the good is held in contrast to conscientia, or the 
actual conscience which is the judgment of conscience in which the orientation is manifested.xxxix  
Hogan notes that these two parts of conscience were originally integrated within Thomistic 
thought, only to be compartmentalized through the advent of casuistry.xl  She frames the function 
of synderesis and conscientia within the new personalist framework, citing this as the most 
significant change in the understanding of the role of conscience.xli  Within a personalist 
theology, 
[C]onscience denotes both the fundamental orientation of the person to seek and 
do the good, and the actualization of this desire in decisions of conscience.  
Conscience is thus understood to be more than the sum of particular decisions, 
although each choice is important.  Conscience also refers to the integrated and 
consistent thrust of the person toward goodness.  It is the dimension of one’s 
character that determines the direction of one’s moral life, one’s self- conscious 
option for good.xlii 
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With Hogan’s reconceptualization of synderesis and conscientia as habitual and actual 
conscience, the link between character or disposition and act lost through casuistry is restored 
and reintegrated when viewed in light of the personalist theology of the Second Vatican Council.  
This understanding of conscience shows the intimate relationship between the kind of person one 
is with the kind of actions that one performs.xliii  Thus, in Hogan’s view, the good conscience is 
one that has the “disposition or orientation to desire the good and is the culmination of a life 
lived consistently in the pursuit of virtue”xliv as opposed to seeing a human being’s act as solely 
indicative of one’s conscience. 
Decision Making in Light of a Personalist Paradigm 
 Consistent with the holistic view of the human person, Hogan seeks to present an 
integrated way of decision-making by understanding reason, intuition, emotion, and imagination 
as fundamentally related to each other.  She examines these four elements because “[a] 
personalist model of conscience should highlight the multidimensional aspects of its decision 
making.”xlv  With reason, she highlights the importance of viewing reason within a contextual 
framework.xlvi  Hogan explains that “[o]ne of the most important roles that reason has in moral 
decision making relates to defining the problem or the issue at stake.”xlvii  She further elaborates 
that “[t]he work of reason, therefore, involves the person in a constant appraisal of every aspect 
of the problem and not just a once-for-all judgment.  Although such rational decisions are 
ultimately personal, they must be made with reference to the wider community.”xlviii  Rationality 
allows one to test or compare one’s reasoning capacity with the reasoning of others in the 
community to be able to honestly assess it.xlix  Intuition, in contrast to reason, is an instinctive 
knowledge that comes from a nonconscious place.l  The reliability of intuition is contingent upon 
the ability of the person to articulate the reasons for trusting the intuitive knowledge; this 
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exercise remains consistent with the integrated activity of conscience.li  Emotion is also 
important in decision-making, although, similar to intuition, it must be critically examined to 
ensure its reliability.lii  Because of the spontaneous nature of emotions, one has to incorporate it 
into the decision making process and decide how much weight it will be given in the integrative 
process.  Finally, Hogan highlights the importance of taking imagination and creativity into the 
decisions of conscience and the formation of character.liii  Imagination is important because 
“[t]he process of reevaluating one’s commitments and redescribing one’s reality is part of the 
process of being human.”liv  An integration of the intellectual, intuitive, emotional, and 
imaginative levels sets the stage for holistic decision making in line with the anthropological 
dimensions of the human being.  “Conscience needs an interplay of each of these elements to 
operate sensitively and successfully.”lv  In light of this understanding of the inward dynamics of 
conscience, how does the individual conscience work in relation with other individuals and 
institutions? 
Hogan’s work is important for three main reasons.  First, she highlights the personalist 
paradigm, in which the person is placed at the center in the discussion of conscience.  Second, 
Hogan reintegrates the concepts of synderesis and conscientia so that a human being’s journey, 
rather than isolated choices, determine the integrity of the human’s life.  Finally, Hogan offers a 
practical way of making decisions in light of the whole person.  Her paradigm remains consistent 
with Rahner’s transcendental theology while addressing contemporary problems in moral 
theology. 
III. Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the development of Catholic moral theology since the modern age and the 
Second Vatican Council has been one marked by a transcendental method in which it returned to 
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the subject.  In light of this return to the subject, what does it mean for the individual subject to 
exercise his or her conscience in relation to other individual consciences?  The next chapter 
explores the American political environment in order to understand how to exercise this 
anthropologically-based understanding of the conscience in the public sphere.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Analysis of the Relational Conscience within Institutions 
 
In the first chapter, I established the inherent dignity of the individual conscience by 
appealing to the anthropologically centered theology of Karl Rahner and the personalist 
paradigm of the Second Vatican Council’s Gaudium et Spes.  In this chapter, I seek to 
understand the relational dimension of conscience.  Guided by a personalist understanding of 
conscience, my analysis centers upon determining how an individual conscience operates in 
relation to other individual consciences and to institutions.  Liberalism, as the operative political 
theory in American public law, raises potential conflicts with a personalist understanding of 
conscience. Despite the current climate of liberalism, a bottom-up approach to conscience could 
effectively overcome those conflicts so as to maintain a personalist understanding of conscience. 
First, I proceed by examining two operative models of social theory: liberalism and 
communitarianism.   Next, I review the Second Vatican Council’s Declaration on Religious 
Freedom (Dignitatis Humanae) to understand the Catholic Church’s view of conscience in light 
of the public sphere to determine if it provides any contributions in the debate between liberalism 
and communitarianism.  Finally, I offer Robert Vischer’s model of relational conscience as a 
way of mediating between liberalism and communitarianism in light of Dignitatis Humanae.  
Vischer’s model offers the bottom-up approach to conscience that could possibly solve this 
Kobayashi Maru scenariolvi, or no-win situation, that the discussion of conscience in the public 
sphere often encounters. 
I. Liberalism 
Liberalism has functioned as the prevailing modern political theory in the United States.  
As a result, liberalism has warranted a particular interpretation of the conscience within U.S. 
political discourse.  Philip Selznick defines liberalism as: 
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...an ideology of constrained liberation, or as we sometimes say, of ordered 
liberty.  A social, political, or economic doctrine is liberal if (1) it seeks to free 
individuals, institutions, and practices from the restraints of custom, dogma, 
vested interest, and centralized authority; and (2) it holds that liberation must take 
place within a framework of orderly process, constitutional principle, and respect 
for social continuity.  Taken together, these criteria distinguish what it means to 
be a liberal from what it means to be a conservative, a radical libertarian, a 
revolutionary, or a collectivist.lvii 
 
Liberalism has taken on a rights-centered focus, brought about first by the social contract theory 
of Immanuel Kant, John Locke, and Thomas Hobbes and adapted later by John Rawls and 
Ronald Dworkin.  Instead of seeing rights in relation to obligations, rights are seen as ends in 
themselves.lviii  Using a rank-ordering system, Rawls prioritizes individual liberty over the 
pursuit of social justice; liberty cannot be sacrificed even for the pursuit of social justice.  
According to Rawls, justice is viewed in terms of fairness.lix  Rather than discussing matters of 
rights and justice through comprehensive doctrines such as religious ones, individuals must 
engage the public sphere with impartiality and appeal to publicly reasonable arguments.  Rawls’ 
idea of fairness as impartiality is based on his concept of the original position.   Rawls’ student, 
Amartya Sen, describes the original position as “an imagined situation of primordial equality, 
when the parties involved have no knowledge of their personal identities, or their respective 
vested interests, within the group as a whole.”lx  The parties would establish the policies for a 
society from behind a veil of ignorance, a state in which the parties would not know what 
particular characteristics they possess.  These characteristics include but are not limited to 
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, and income level.  Under the Rawlsian concepts of the 
original position and the veil of ignorance, the principles of justice are determined by the basic 
social institutions that should govern the society the parties, through their imagination, create.lxi 
This rights-centered understanding is problematic because “rights are divorced from 
discipline and duty…. [t]he ethos of liberalism…gives rights a life of their own, detached from 
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the assessment of conditions and consequences.”lxii  This detachment is illustrated through the 
aforementioned concepts of the original position and the veil of ignorance.  Because society is 
seen from a state of perfection, it fails to take into account the realities surrounding the plurality 
of American society.  The human person disintegrates into the ideal society when society is 
viewed from a veil of ignorance.  As a result, the intrinsic worth of the human person is 
overlooked and undervalued. 
Although liberalism’s current approach disregards human dignity, the roots of liberalism 
are attributed to the modern understanding of the human person from Christianity.  Kenneth 
Grasso highlights liberalism’s deviation from the original Christian understanding: “[w]hat 
modern liberalism did was to lay claim to one of the consequences of the revolution in human 
self-understanding brought about by Christianity – the recognition of the irreplaceable worth and 
unique value of each and every human being – while rejecting its source.”lxiii  Grasso asserts that 
liberalism is incompatible with Catholic social teaching due to its deviation from the Christian 
conception of the soul and its destiny on earth.lxiv  Liberalism is disguised as a vehicle to promote 
the individual; however, in virtue of the Christian understanding that the communal dimension of 
human existence is ultimately grounded in the relational aspects of the imago dei.  In practice, 
liberalism remains insensitive to the human person. 
Although it purports to protect individual rights, liberalism does so at the expense of 
failing to respect the dignity of the human person and selfhood.  Under the model of liberalism, 
conscience is viewed as a right detached from any obligation or context.  Liberty of conscience, 
as many other rights, is viewed as an absolute; when conscience is viewed as connected with 
religion, it brings about a partiality that liberalism cannot tolerate.  Given this socio-political 
landscape, the anthropologically-centered view of conscience presented in the first chapter is 
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unable to flourish.  As a result, political theorists have searched for an alternative to the 
absolutism of liberalism through an alternative theory known as communitarianism. 
II. Communitarianism 
Philip Selznick proposes a different model for society, based on the common good.  In 
contrast to the ideals of liberalism, the idea of the common good runs against the pervasive idea 
that moral judgment is inescapably subjective and relative.lxv  Selznick seeks to return to a 
values-centered constitutional theory.lxvi  “The well-being of individuals depends on the health of 
the collectivity; therefore, society must be the unit of analysis, and the common good must be the 
focus of our striving.  The common good in turn requires ‘an area of individual liberty.’”lxvii  In 
other words, focusing on the common good is a vehicle to promoting the individual liberty that 
liberalism fails to promote in practice. 
Selznick sees community not as a unity of any sort but a specific type of unity that 
“preserves the integrity of persons, groups, and institutions.”lxviii  By creating bonds and proving 
pathways for participation, the community experience becomes richer.lxix  Rather than appealing 
to a liberal structure, the communitarian perspective is “profoundly federalist in spirit and 
structure.”lxx  Selznick views a true communitarian model as moderating between the two 
extremes of a model of total integration and a model that barely sustains a minimal moral 
order.lxxi 
Selznick outlines the diversity of communitarian views, contrasting the difference 
between the conservative and the anarchist.  In contrasting the differing poles, Selznick reminds 
the reader that “[t]he multi-valued perspective of [communitarianism] demands a high tolerance 
for ambiguity.”lxxii  While both views prefer decentralization and self-regulation, they differ in 
their reliance on the historical community.  While the conservative view finds moral worth in the 
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historical community, the anarchist views an ideal community as one detached from the 
historical community.lxxiii  However, Selznick finds neither view to sufficiently provide a reliable 
guide to the moral community. 
Consistent with Selznick’s observations, Grasso also notes the disintegrated nature of 
communitarianism.  Rather than being a proactive movement seen independently of liberalism, it 
is a theory reacting to the inadequacies of liberalism.lxxiv  The key components of 
communitarianism include “a common desire to forge a new public philosophy taking its 
bearings from man’s nature as a social being and emphasizing the importance of public 
spiritedness, participation, and the common good.”lxxv  Communitarianism takes into account the 
fact that human beings are not separate and independent individuals; the communities that one is 
a part of and roles that an individual plays within them are constitutive of a human being’s 
identity.lxxvi  The selfhood of a human person is inseparable from one’s membership in the 
communities and the roles that one plays.lxxvii 
In contrast with Selznick, Grasso, hesitant to accept communitarianism as the antidote to 
liberalism, determines that communitarianism is not a satisfactory alternative to liberal 
individualism.lxxviii  He doubts that communitarianism has adequately supplied a coherent, 
intellectually sophisticated model of humanity and society.lxxix  He questions whether a theory of 
politics centered upon the good of the community rather than the rights of an individual can 
serve as the moral foundation of a free society.lxxx  Finally, Grasso sees as problematic the claim 
of communitarians that the liberal tradition possesses the intellectual resources necessary to 
address the current crisis of the liberal theory.lxxxi  Grasso, in comparing the attributes of 
liberalism and communitarianism, finds that communitarianism is not a viable alternative to 
liberalism because the problems of liberalism remain unresolved. 
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To solve this seemingly no-win situation, Grasso turns to Richard John Neuhaus, who 
says “this can and should be the moment in which the Roman Catholic Church in the United 
States assumes its rightful role in the culture-forming task of constructing a religiously informed 
public philosophy for the American experience in ordered liberty.”lxxxii  This view is problematic 
for liberalism, as it seeks to free individuals and institutions from the restraints of dogma and 
centralized authority. 
Although it is not necessarily a solution to the problems posed by liberalism because of 
its shared history rooted in the Enlightenment, the Catholic Church’s understanding of 
conscience and the common good possibly contains some answers to the current dilemmas 
brought about by liberalism and communitarianism. 
III. The Catholic Church and Relational Conscience: Dignitatis Humanae 
In light of the liberal environment of the American public sphere, we now turn to the 
Catholic Church’s stance on conscience in relation to the public sphere.  In addition to Gaudium 
et Spes, the Second Vatican Council also issued Dignitatis Humanae (hereinafter Dignitatis), a 
declaration on religious liberty.  The declaration states: 
This [right to religious freedom] becomes even clearer if one considers that the 
highest norm of human life is the divine law itself….God has enabled the human 
person to share in this law so that, under the gentle disposition of divine 
providence, many may be able to arrive at an even deeper knowledge of 
unchangeable truth.  For this reason everybody has the duty and consequently the 
right to seek the truth in religious matters so that, through the use of appropriate 
means, they may form prudent judgments of conscience which are sincere and 
true.  The search for truth, however, must be carried out in a manner that is 
appropriate to the dignity and the social nature of the human person….The human 
person sees and recognizes the demands of the divine law through conscience.  
All are bound to follow their conscience faithfully in every sphere of activity so 
that they may come to God, who is their last end.  Therefore, the individual must 
not be forced to act against conscience nor be prevented from acting according to 
conscience, especially in religious matters.lxxxiii 
 
25 
 
Consistent with the themes of Gaudium et Spes, Dignitatis approaches the human being from the 
personalist paradigm discussed in the first chapter.  The declaration situates the dictates of the 
conscience as a sharing with divine law.  As a gift from God, God existentially created humans 
to have the truth written in their hearts.  Because of this existential condition, Dignitatis sets 
forth a duty to listen to this divine law.  Unlike the liberalist perspective, the right of liberty 
comes from the duty that arises from the conscience. 
In discussing religious freedom, the declaration situates the liberty of conscience as a 
human right.  The distinguishing characteristic of Dignitatis vis-à-vis Gaudium et Spes is the 
relational nature of conscience; the declaration mandates that an individual must not be 
prevented from acting according to his or her conscience within all spheres of life, including the 
public sphere.  Thus, in order to maintain true integrity, a human person must be able to act with 
the dictates of his or her conscience within the public sphere. 
Conscience and Religious Liberty 
Dignitatis, in acknowledging this modern shift to historical consciousness, legitimizes the 
human conscience as a source of information for Church teaching.lxxxiv  The newly discovered 
truth lies in the dignity of the human person.lxxxv  While the Church recognizes the intrinsic 
dignity of the human person and the conscience, the Church carefully rejects a relativist view of 
human knowledge and truth.lxxxvi  “Unlike liberal political theory, Dignitatis situates religious 
freedom not in the right of a free conscience, but in the duty of a conscience objectively bound 
by the obligation to seek and embrace truth.”lxxxvii  Dignitatis views the conscience as bound by a 
larger truth, as opposed to the liberal stance of impartiality with regards to truth:  “…[J]ust as 
liberalism recognizes its role in caring for the well-being of its establishment of irreligion, the 
Church makes a counterclaim that a property ordered state must care for the well-being of its 
26 
 
claim of religious truth.”lxxxviii  Through Dignitatis and Selznick’s definition of liberalism as 
seeking to free individuals and institutions from the restraints of dogma and centralized 
authority, we can clearly see the tension with the role of truth in an understanding of conscience. 
While both the Catholic Church and liberalism find their roots in the Enlightenment 
through a return to the human person, the Catholic Church is careful not to make the same 
mistakes as liberalism.  Dignitatis takes into account the mutual relationship between rights and 
duty: rights cannot stand alone without duties. 
 Dignitatis Humanae situates the mandate for all to follow their conscience within every 
sphere of activity, including the public sphere.  The major issue surrounding the exercise of 
conscience in the public sphere centers upon potential conflicts over multiple consciences.  In 
light of the liberal state of the American public sphere, the question remains as to whether it is 
possible for a person of faith to exercise his or her conscience.  Robert Vischer offers a possible 
solution through the mediating function of institutions.  
IV. Robert Vischer’s Model of the Mediating Function of Institutions 
In Conscience and the Common Good, Robert Vischer examines conscience in relation to 
the state.  Vischer highlights the state’s legal deference to the individual conscience, even in the 
situation where one conscience loses out to another conscience.  Because the United States has 
adapted a liberalist approach to the conscience, the state is hesitant to have any involvement in 
anything that deals with the conscience. 
In order to understand the current American environment and how it treats conscience, I 
examine the confusion over conscience and religion.  I then analyze the current legal paradigm 
that has been heavily influenced by liberalism.  Finally, I offer Vischer’s proposal to use 
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institutions as a mediating function for the relational conscience in order to promote the common 
good within the landscape of liberalism. 
Distinguishing Conscience and Religion   
 
The difficulties associated in the discussion of relational conscience stem partly from the 
synonymous association of liberty of conscience with freedom of religion.  While religion can 
often factor into conscience formation, Dignitatis situates conscience as an intrinsic feature of 
human dignity.  Religion, in contrast, is an extrinsic reality that differs with each human person 
depending on his or her place in time or location.  Because of the constitutional protection of 
religion, courts have been hesitant to rule on conscience-related issues.  Vischer highlights this 
through his treatment of formation of conscience.  He explains how the legal system’s 
epistemological agnosticism has gotten in the way of truly respecting liberty of conscience.  
“The Establishment Clause [of the Constitution] should not be read to foreclose the law’s 
treatment of religion as a distinct category of conscience-driven claims.”lxxxix  He continues by 
explaining that “[t]he most obvious reason why the law tends to treat conscience within the 
individual-versus-state paradigm is the close historical association between conscience and 
religious liberty.”xc  Conscience is seen in an individualist light as its conception has been 
adopted from a Protestant idea of conscience.  The Protestant idea of conscience viewed a direct 
connection between the individual and God in matters of salvation and spirituality.  In contrast, 
Dignitatis promotes an idea of conscience based in community, that is, connection with the 
public sphere.  The individually-centered view of conscience coupled with the legal system’s 
epistemological agnosticism has resulted in the separation of religious from non-religious 
conscience, with non-religious conscience winning over religious conscience. 
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Vischer argues against this trend, citing individualism as the reason for the current 
laissez-faire stance on conscience.  He purports that “[w]e need to expand our understanding of 
conscience, not only to support and secure the common good, but also to facilitate the continuing 
vitality of conscience itself.”xci  Vischer emphasizes the relational conscience and the mediating 
institutions’ necessary function in allowing citizens to exercise this relational dimension of 
conscience.  His fear is that conscience will lose its intrinsic dignity if the social system 
continues on its current individualist trajectory. 
Individual-versus-state paradigm 
Vischer introduces the current legal paradigm, one consistent with liberalism.  He asserts 
that “[f]ocusing on the point of individual-versus-state conflict has been essential to the 
American legal system’s success in maintaining conscience as a bulwark, shielding the 
individual from the state’s coercive power.”xcii  This paradigm has led to a model that ceases any 
dialogue as to what the common good entails.  Instead, this model promotes battles between 
consciences and places the state in the position to choose which conscience must be followed 
and which conscience must be violated.  The state, consistent with the mistaken view that 
conscience shaped by religion or faith compromises religious liberty, then proceeds to choose 
whose conscience wins.  In effect, the state’s position of supposed impartiality guarantees that 
the non-religious conscience wins.  Often, the state will side with the non-religious conscience in 
order to avoid any Establishment Clause violations.  Vischer is looking to propose a solution in 
which the state is not the decider of whose conscience wins.  Rather, Vischer wants the state to 
act as a mediator, allowing for the forum to exercise one’s conscience. 
Because of this current paradigm, the state has failed to focus on the substance of any 
conscience claims.  Rather, by sorting out the subject matter of the claims, the state automatically 
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rules on the side of the non-religious conscience.  Vischer notes that “the law must pay attention 
to the substance of conscience’s claims and to their impact on the state’s legitimate pursuit of the 
common good.”xciii  Rather than just looking at one small part of the conscience claim, the state 
should look at its full impact on the political order.  Given this problematic paradigm, Vischer 
questions the state’s role in adjudicating conscience claims.   
Paradoxically, the state’s stance of neutrality violates the very problem it seeks to avoid: 
it establishes its own form of secular conscience.  Vischer highlights this problem by explaining 
that “[w]hen the state encroaches on the venues in which people live out their core beliefs, the 
cause of conscience suffers.  It is no answer to point out the state’s self-restraint in intruding on 
the inner sanctum of the mind; conscience cannot easily or prudently be separated from 
action.”xciv  In the earlier discussion of liberalism, the main difficulty arising from liberal politics 
theory is the divorce of rights from duties.  The problem with liberalism that shapes the current 
problem with conscience in the public sphere emanates from an apparent impartiality, which in 
reality becomes an endorsement for secular beliefs.  Communitarianism might offer some relief, 
as it departs from the individual-centered paradigm of liberalism.  However, given the reactive 
foundation of the communitarian movement, other solutions to this problem may be more viable.  
Synthesizing ideas from Catholic, Calvinist, and sociological models, Vischer offers a proposal 
for the state’s proper role in the discussion of liberty of conscience. 
Institutions as mediating the exercise of individual conscience 
Vischer proposes a solution in which the state is not the decider of whose conscience 
wins.  “When the state encroaches on the venues in which people live out their core beliefs, the 
cause of conscience suffers.  It is no answer to point out the state’s self-restraint in intruding on 
the inner sanctum of the mind; conscience cannot easily or prudently be separated from 
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action.”xcv  The state’s involvement with conscience claims has implicitly created a divide 
between belief and action; consequently, it has undermined the very definition of conscience. 
In contrast to the state’s current role, Vischer wants the state to act as a mediator.  The 
state’s primary role is to provide the forum for citizens to exercise their conscience.  “Even 
within the positive law, the state cannot presume to enforce any particular vision of the moral 
good or to shape the substance of its citizens’ visions of the good; rather, it is to mediate among 
the citizens’ competing visions of the good.”xcvi  By taking sides on a conscience claim, the state 
enforces its own theory of the moral good upon society. 
Rather than leaving the task to the state, Vischer seeks to have the individual citizens 
decide what the common good is for society. 
If our focus is only on belief, conscience has very little to do with personal 
integrity, which requires a unity of action and belief.  Protecting conscience-as-
action is an essential component of ensuring that individuals’ lives can unfold in 
narrative form.  The moral coherence on which a personal narrative is built 
requires an ability to integrate the various strands of life into a relatively seamless 
story…xcvii   
 
In light of the interconnectedness of action and belief in the exercise of personal integrity, 
Vischer proposes that the true place to exercise one’s conscience is through a venue or a space of 
an individual’s choosing rather than through the state.  These venues or spaces include 
institutions or voluntary associations which align with an individual’s belief.  In allowing 
individuals to associate with certain institutions or associations, the association would be the 
vehicle for promoting certain conscience claims.  In Vischer’s theory of the moral marketplace, 
the institution or association’s viability would be dependent upon the individuals who choose to 
associate with the institution or association.  This bottom-up approach allows the state to avoid 
adjudicating conscience claims but also allows the individual to maintain integrity of conscience 
by allowing the individual a forum to exercise the conscience. 
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Although Vischer’s model is relational, it leaves responsibility with the individual, who is 
the ultimate moral actor is pursuing his or her own personal integrity.  While Vischer’s relational 
model could create new problems, he explains that “…an externally oriented conscience is 
preferable to the privatized, personalized conscience that amounts to meaninglessness.”xcviii  In 
the past, the state has deferred to a stance of neutrality and avoided any major conflict.  Vischer 
believes that the potential conflict may be necessary to protect the viability of conscience.  He 
warns that “[d]efining conscience [solely] as freedom of belief avoids the tough questions…, but 
it eviscerates the power of conscience, which is more properly understood as moral belief 
applied to conduct.”xcix  True liberty of conscience means requires the need to understand the 
relatedness of belief and action despite the problems that arise from connecting duties to rights. 
To promote the relational conscience, Vischer appeals to the common good.  
“Maintaining space for conscience-driven action furthers the common good to the extent that 
individuals’ moral beliefs motivate their participation in the myriad associations that stand 
between the individual and the state.”c  Not only do individuals have a true liberty of conscience; 
in exercising that liberty, individuals further the common good. 
Although it seems that a relational dimension to conscience eliminates the individual, 
Vischer highlights how the relational dimension can actually promote the individual much more 
effectively than the liberal model.  “Conscience’s relational dimension can be understood as a 
lens through which to bring our citizens’ expansive self-understandings into clearer focus.”ci  
Vischer distinguishes the common good from the collective good in order to effectively situate 
the role of the state.  “The state, as society’s only legitimate purveyor of coercive force, must act 
with deference toward the dimension of the common good that is not defined by the collective 
will…”cii  In the realm of conscience, Vischer proposes that the state, in light of its conceptual 
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and practical separation from society, should perform the following actions: first, appreciate the 
social nature of the human being; second, permit individuals and the groups to which they belong 
broad discretion to pursue moral identities that are not favored by the majority or contemplated 
by the premises of liberalism; third, the state should focus its equality initiatives on ensuring 
goods and services, not on enshrining equality as a nonnegotiable requirement for marketplace 
participation; and fourth, embracing moral pluralism does not preclude the building of social 
consensus on issues of common importance.ciii  In other words, Vischer argues that in order to 
truly give liberty of conscience, the presuppositions of liberalism need to be reconsidered and 
challenged because those presuppositions undermine the exercise of conscience in the public 
sphere. 
Vischer sees a flourishing of conscience and participation by individuals as essential to 
social stability.civ  When individuals truly feel like they have the power to act on their beliefs and 
participate in the public sphere, it is the hallmark of true freedom.  Vischer’s bottom-up approach 
accomplishes a number of conscience-related dilemmas: first, it extinguishes the need to separate 
religious from non-religious conscience; second, it truly maintains the state’s role of neutrality in 
the realm of conscience claims; and finally, and most importantly, it allows for the citizen to 
freely exercise his or her conscience within the public sphere through the use of the institution. 
V. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I introduced the theories of liberalism and communitarianism to set the 
landscape of American society.  In surveying the political landscape, I demonstrated that 
liberalism creates many problems for the practice of conscience because it focuses upon rights 
without regard for duties.  Communitarianism, although attempting to address the problems of 
liberalism, creates its own set of new problems.  I offered Dignitatis Humanae as possible 
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dialogue partner with liberalism because it focuses on the personhood of the human person as 
well as accounts for rights with duties.  Finally, I introduced Vischer and his idea of the 
mediating function of the state as a way to balance the communitarian perspectives and the 
perspective brought about by Dignitatis Humanae. 
The discussion about the conscience in relation to the public sphere reveals the current 
disharmony present in the American political landscape.  Vischer’s proposal offers a possible 
solution to mediating competing conscience claims while dealing with the current political 
environment of liberalism.  In light of the discussion in chapter one on the internal condition of 
the human person and the discussion in this chapter about the external condition within the 
American public sphere, I continue and conclude my analysis by looking at the practical 
dimension of liberty of conscience.  In the final chapter, I examine what I believe to be a way to 
exercise the liberty of conscience consistent with Vischer’s bottom-up approach.  Drawing upon 
the wisdom of Ignatian spirituality, I explore the practical ways in which a person of faith can 
exercise his or her conscience within the public sphere. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Applying the Principles of Ignatian Spirituality to Conscience 
 
In the first chapter, I described the individual conscience as intrinsically and 
anthropologically based.  In the second chapter, I demonstrated the importance of a public forum 
in which conscience can properly be exercised within a pluralistic society.  Given the 
understanding of individual conscience and the difficulties associated with exercising the 
conscience within a pluralistic society, it is imperative to find a resource to help one maintain 
integrity of conscience in light of these internal and external contexts.  In light of the concerns 
over maintaining the freedom of an anthropologically-based notion of conscience within the 
public sphere, Ignatian spirituality is full of wisdom to aid the ordinary person in making 
decisions within his or her life.  First, I demonstrate that while other types of spiritual disciplines 
are available, Ignatian discernment is best suited in decision-making because it respects the 
understanding of conscience discussed in chapter one.  Next, I highlight the two important 
concepts of contemplation and discernment within Ignatian Spirituality as a way to understand 
reality.  Finally, I introduce a central idea of Ignatian Spirituality called the “contemplative in 
action” as a way to understand the concept of the relational conscience discussed in chapter two. 
I. Suitability of Ignatian Spirituality 
While moral theology is often regarded as a distinct area from spirituality,cv the 
discussion on conscience stands to greatly benefit from spirituality.  Anthony Egan, SJ suggests 
the importance of incorporating moral theology and spirituality into ethics in order to avoid a 
compartmentalization of Catholic life.cvi  Moral theology is often seen as a list of what one can 
and cannot do; in contrast, spirituality is often seen as a way to connect with an ultimate reality 
on an intimate basis.  The two are not often seen in an integrated light.  In the traditional 
manualist school of moral theology, rules are seen as black and white, often not requiring the 
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individual person to examine seriously his or her disposition; the focus was on the act.  This 
heightened focus on act rather than the integration of intent and act results in a 
compartmentalization of Catholic life. 
Ignatian Spirituality is as an alternative to that compartmentalization because Patrick A. 
Heelan, SJ writes that “[t]he Spiritual Exercises [a primary source for Ignatian Spirituality] do 
not teach doctrine or morals.  When used by an experienced master, they prepare a person to 
experience and to discern the affects that accompany the practice of living the ‘memory’ of 
Chris’s life, death, and resurrection.”cvii  Rather than prescribing hard rules, Ignatian Spirituality 
invites the human being to understand his or her life experience in light of a relationship with 
God.  Ignatian Spirituality avoids dichotomies in favor of a more integrated understanding of the 
human person and respects and understanding of conscience set forth in the first chapter.   
II. Ignatian Contemplation and Discernment 
While Ignatian Spirituality is characterized by a holistic nature, for purposes of 
consistency with the prior chapters, I begin with an individual focus through the concepts of 
contemplation and discernment, with a goal to synthesize it with the relational dimension of 
Ignatian Spirituality. 
Ignatian Contemplation 
The first major concept that is useful for our analysis on conscience is the idea of 
contemplation.  Walter Burghardt, SJ, defines contemplation as “a long, loving look at the 
real.”cviii  One component of contemplation is the use of the imagination.  Adolfo Nicolas, SJ, 
Superior General of the Society of Jesus, explains that “[o]ne might call this ‘pedagogy’ of 
Ignatian contemplation the exercise of the creative imagination.  The imagination works in 
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cooperation with Memory, as we know from the Exercises.”cix  In using the imagination, one 
looks at reality through recalling experiences. 
Nicolas notes the importance of imagination to Ignatian Spirituality because it 
…is a creative process that goes to the depth of reality and begins recreating it.  
Ignatian contemplation is a very powerful tool, and it is a shifting from the left 
side of the brain to the right.  But it is essential to understand that imagination is 
not the same as fantasy.  Fantasy is flight from reality, to a world where we create 
images for the sake of a diversity of images.  Imagination grasps reality.  In other 
words, depth of thought and imagination in the Ignatian tradition involves a 
profound engagement with the real, a refusal to let go until one goes beneath the 
surface.  It is a careful analysis (dismembering) for the sake of an integration 
(remembering) around what is deepest: God, Christ, the Gospel.  The starting 
point, then, will always be what is real.”cx 
 
Thus, Ignatian imagination and contemplation are vehicles for understanding and living within a 
concrete reality.  As discussed in chapter two, liberalism’s idealistic view of public life creates a 
lack of resonance with reality.  Ignatian imagination is a way of getting in touch with the 
concrete world in order to transcend it and think of other alternatives.  It calls a person to be 
aware of his or her thoughts and actions in light of reality. 
Since Ignatian imagination requires a heightened awareness of reality, it is important to 
look back at one’s day to see what has occurred.  Ignatian spirituality’s famous prayer has a 
person looking back at his or her day through an Examination of Consciousness or the Examen.  
Dennis Hamm, SJ describes the Examen as a prayer that deals with the full contents of one’s 
consciousness.cxi  He expands the English definition of conscience by appealing to the broader 
scope of the word for conscience in French and Spanish, Romance languages which view the 
word as moral awareness, judgment, and consciousness.cxii  Hamm offers five steps to doing the 
daily Examen: 1) pray for light, 2) review the day in thanksgiving, 3) review the feelings that 
surface in the replay of the day, 4) choose one of those feelings (positive or negative) and pray 
from it, and 5) look toward tomorrow.cxiii  He names this process “rummaging for God”cxiv 
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because it is akin to looking through a drawer for something that you cannot find but you know 
is there.  Given our understanding of conscience as being intrinsic to all human beings, the 
Examen provides a helpful method for understanding an individual’s deepest longings.  Once a 
person understands his or her longings, he or she can act in accordance with those inner dictates. 
Monika Hellwig, in describing the Spiritual Exercises, explains that “most characteristic 
of all, the whole process is geared to consciousness raising of the individual…to be alert to one’s 
own motivations and inclinations, and to learn to discern what is the voice of the Holy Spirit of 
God and what is the voice of a spirit that is counter to God’s Spirit, a spirit of destruction and 
disorientation.”cxv  This practice of being aware of one’s dispositions gives a person the freedom 
and control to choose a course of action that is aligned with his or her disposition.  When a 
human person rushes to action without first consulting his or her inner conscience, the choice 
that results may be incongruent with a person’s disposition.  The goal of awareness is to align a 
person’s actions with his or her disposition to promote self-integrity.  While the use of 
imagination in gaining awareness of reality focuses on motivations, inclinations and inner 
dispositions, the Ignatian concept known as discernment facilitates the course of action a human 
person would take in light of that inner awareness. 
Ignatian Discernment 
The second Ignatian concept, discernment, examines the freedom of a human person and 
the choices made as a result of that freedom.  David Lonsdale describes discernment as a tool for 
decision-making: 
In scripture, in tradition, the Church, our own consciences and powers of 
judgment, and in many other gifts, God has given us aids to the responsible 
exercise in our freedom.  God’s will is that we should exercise our freedom 
responsibly and well by choosing what honestly seems the best course of action in 
a given set of circumstances…cxvi 
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He defines discernment as an art of appreciating those gifts and responding to that love.cxvii  As 
an art form, it is a way of making a choice as response to God on the basis of different affective 
movements.  Thus, the first task is to determine what movements are stirring within the person. 
Prior to determining the movements that occur, discernment requires a predisposition of 
interior freedom.  This predisposition, which is often called Ignatian indifference, questions what 
effect exterior stimuli have on a person’s freedom.  Interior freedom deals with what Ignatian 
spirituality terms as “inordinate attachments.”  Ignatian spirituality recognizes the importance of 
human desires.  Instead of rejecting human desires altogether, Ignatius integrates human desires 
by distinguishing between ordered and disordered attachments.  In contrast to relying on 
inordinate attachments to guide our decisions, Ignatian spirituality proposes a stance of 
indifference, where the human being is open to whatever choice would lead to the end for which 
he or she is created. 
In order to understand affective stirrings, Ignatius describes the difference between good 
and evil spirits by the effect the spirit has on the person.  “[I]n those who go on from good to 
better, the good angel touches such soul sweetly, lightly, and gently, like a drop of water which 
enters into a sponge, and the evil touches it sharply and with noise and disquiet, as when the drop 
of water falls on the stone.”cxviii  Ignatius labels these effects as consolation and desolation.  
Although consolation is often understood as joy and desolation is often understood as despair, 
these two concepts must be seen in relation to God.  In other words, consolation is viewed as an 
orientation towards God; in contrast, desolation is an orientation away from God.  This 
understanding accounts for the times when one suffers as a result of one’s orientation towards 
God or the times when one is content but feeling empty inside. 
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Orientation towards God is important because it highlights the importance of disposition.  
Rather than focusing solely on a person’s actions, Ignatius’ focus on consolation and desolation 
aids us in understanding why we are doing something.  For example, a person who donates 
money to church each week on the surface seems like a good person.  With the Ignatian method, 
one would have to ask himself or herself, ‘why am I donating to the church?’  If it is out of a 
sense of looking good in front of other people, one could argue that the donation is made by 
turning towards something other than God, thus producing desolation.  In contrast, if one donates 
out of a way to gift God what God has originally given, then one could argue that the donation is 
made in light of turning towards God, thus producing consolation.  This orientation, or 
synderesis, helps us situate why we do things.  Through his practical guidelines for discernment, 
Ignatius highlights the inherent importance of the habitual conscience.  However, in addition to 
paying attention to disposition, it is also important to understand action in conjunction with 
disposition. 
The Three Times for Making an Election (hereinafter Election) examines how to make a 
decision consistent with the inner stirrings that a person discovers.  The Election takes into 
account a person’s intellect, feelings, and intuition.  Halfway through the thirty-day retreat at the 
end of the second week, Ignatius offers the Election.  He characterizes the first time as one where 
the election or choice is undeniable.  “The first time is, when God our Lord so moves and attracts 
the will, that without doubting, or being able to doubt, such devout soul follows what is shown 
it…”cxix  Ignatius’ illumination at the river Cordoner was arguably the first time of making an 
election; it sustained him throughout his whole life.cxx  Ignatius explains that he “experienced a 
great clarity in his understanding.  This was such that in the whole course of his life, after 
completing sixty-two years…he does not think he had got as much as at that one time.”cxxi  
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While the first time is powerful and life altering, it is very rare to have such a strong conviction 
about a choice. 
Ignatius describes the second time of election as one “when enough light and knowledge 
is received by experience of consolations and desolations, and by the experience of discernment 
of various spirits.”cxxii  Because discernment of spirits involves listening to the affective 
movements of the heart, the second election is characterized by prioritizing the emotional 
stirrings of a person. 
In contrast to the emotional focus of the second time, the third time is characterized by a 
lack of affective movements.  “The third time is quiet….when the soul is not acted upon by 
various spirits, and used its natural powers freely and tranquilly.”cxxiii  Because the heart is not 
giving any signals regarding a decision, a process based on logic would be most appropriate in 
decision-making under the third election.  For example, one could list the positives and negatives 
of a decision to determine which one is most logical.  Thus, instead of relying on emotional 
stirrings, one would primarily rely on reasoning in the third election.   
Because the first time of making an election is so rare, a person will often encounter the 
choices summarized in either the second or third time.  When making an election within the 
second and third time, the goal is to have an election that is integrated with the whole person.  
Thus, the second and third times cannot be seen alone.  Wilkie Au coins the accountability of the 
second and third elections as “integrity of effect.”cxxiv  Because the second and third times do not 
have the same undeniable characteristic of the first election, it is necessary to use the reasoning 
process to test the second time and to understand the affective movements to test the third time. 
This Ignatian concept of decision-making is important for the discussion on conscience 
because it offers a practical method for making judgments of actual conscience or conscientia.  
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The Election provides the moral agent with an approach to the decision-making process that 
utilizes a person’s intellect, emotions, and intuition rather than privileging one part over another.  
Additionally, the Election allows for a holistic method consistent with the theological 
anthropology and the anthropologically-centered notion of conscience presented in the first 
chapter. 
Ignatian contemplation and imagination are important corollaries to discernment because 
the powers of imagining are “a manner of experiencing and then discerning…first in the course 
of such imaginative exercises, and finally at the heart of daily human living.  By the correct use 
of such discernment, one was enabled automatically to come to those decisions that were (to use 
the motto of the Jesuit order) ‘for the greater glory of God.’”cxxv  The point of the Ignatian 
practices of contemplation and discernment is to center life around God.  In chapter one, I 
established the centrality of God in an anthropologically-based understanding of conscience.  
Thus, Ignatian spirituality uniquely complements the aforementioned definition of conscience. 
III. The Contemplative in Action 
A hallmark of Ignatian spirituality (and why it is the most appropriate form of spirituality 
in light of the discussion of individual and relational conscience) is the Ignatian concept of the 
“contemplative in action.”  While the calling to be “contemplatives in action” (simul in actione 
contemplativus) was coined by Jerome Nadal, SJ, the spirit of being in prayer while in action is 
located throughout the Spiritual Exercises. 
Wilkie Au elaborates further on the concept of being a contemplative in action.  Au 
writes that “[i]n Ignatian spirituality, service takes on great significance because it is seen as a 
way of collaborating with God.”cxxvi  In reviewing the first Spiritual Exercise, First Principle and 
Foundation, with the last Exercise, The Contemplation to Attain Love, Au posits the two 
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exercises as an inclusio, a literary device that creates a frame by placing familiar matter at the 
beginning and end of a text.cxxvii  Both exercises invite the retreatant to stand in grateful awe 
before God and to contextualize service to God within a relationship of love and as a grateful 
response to God’s gift.cxxviii  While contemplation, as stated earlier, is a long loving look at the 
real, action is the corollary which responds to the real.  Nadal, a close companion of Ignatius, 
describes that “Ignatius’ special grace was the ability to see and contemplate in all things, 
actions, and conversations the presence of God and the love of spiritual things, to remain a 
contemplative even in the midst of action.”cxxix  While contemplation is often an individual 
directive, in Ignatian spirituality it is seen in conjunction with action; that is, one’s actions are 
dictated by what occurs within that communication with God.  As such, Ignatian spirituality 
remains the most appropriate way of practicing conscience in light of the earlier chapters’ 
discussion on the intrinsic relationship between individual consciences and the groups those 
consciences belong to. 
Michael W. Cooper, SJ also notes the context of the Spiritual Exercises.  In light of 
Ignatius’ understanding of the Church of his time as corrupt and abusive, “[h]e grasped the need 
for a strategy that would free individuals and groups from personal and societal constraints so 
that they could challenge the manipulative and self-serving status quo of ecclesial and societal 
structures.”cxxx  The Spiritual Exercises and Ignatian Spirituality are rooted in providing freedom 
through awareness of the inner dictates of one’s conscience and action in light of that awareness.  
Despite a political context that might not particularly be amenable to a God-centered spirituality, 
Ignatian spirituality responds to the existential needs of the human personcxxxi making it difficult 
to be simply labeled as a religious movement.  Because of its ability to transcend religious 
differences, Ignatian spirituality has the potential to address the pluralism of our modern world. 
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Cooper writes that “Ignatian spirituality has an apostolic thrust; its goal is unitative 
action, that is, a felt sense of bondedness with Christ in the midst of active life and ministry.”cxxxii  
In the second chapter, I advocated for engagement with the world through a relational 
understanding of conscience.  The purpose of the inner work of contemplation and discernment 
is to prepare for action within the public sphere.  Unlike liberalism’s disunity with the individual, 
Ignatian spirituality grounds the personhood of the individual through these life-affirming 
practices.  Rather than functioning as a reaction to liberalism, Ignatian spirituality gives the 
human person the opportunity to transcend the real by looking at the real. 
Ignatian spirituality often receives the critique that it is too individualistic.cxxxiii  Cooper 
argues that Ignatius was a pioneer in ushering in the Modern Age because his spirituality freed 
people from a static and passive destiny that came from antiquated social structures.cxxxiv  
“Ignatius challenged people to wake up and actively claim their proper destiny and individual 
gifts in the context of their personal relationship to God and express them in service in the 
community….he made the connection between the personal and the communal dimensions of the 
human person integral to each other.”cxxxv  In Hellwig’s description of prime characteristics of 
Ignatian spirituality, she explains the impact of this type of spirituality on one’s public life: the 
gradual elimination of the profane margins of one’s life.  Hellwig writes that, 
[I]n Ignatian spirituality this does not mean that one no longer engages in worldly 
responsibilities or in social, economic, and political affairs.  What it does mean is 
that engagement in such affairs ceases to be profane, which means outside of the 
range of the religious commitment.  All secular activities of life are brought into 
the faith commitment….This commitment to the integration of all aspects of life, 
therefore, does not allow a separation of politics and economics from religious 
values and judgments.cxxxvi 
 
Ignatian spirituality is truly integrative when the differences between the individual and the 
community that the individual relates to become one whole. 
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An integrated life requires the individual to take into account both the external and 
internal dimensions of life.  Au writes that “[h]olistic discernment requires paying close attention 
to what goes on both in the external world and in our inner world of feelings and desires, through 
thoughts and bodily sensations, dreams and fantasies, aspirations and fears.”cxxxvii  Ignatian 
spirituality is suited at balancing both the external and internal worlds of an individual without 
prioritizing one to the detriment of the other.  It seriously takes into consideration the necessity 
of integrating a person’s public and private life.  Through Vischer’s bottom-up approach in 
which the individual exercises his or her conscience through the mediating function of 
institutions coupled with the understanding of conscience set forth in the first chapter, an 
individual can make decisions in a holistic and integrated manner. 
While integrating both the external, public life with the internal, personal world is a 
challenging task, it is a worthy goal that leads to the freedom that God intended for human 
beings to have.  It is a challenge to integrate one’s life when one grows accustomed to 
compartmentalizing his or her life.  It is important to educate people in the integrative life; the 
place for that education is through the communities in which a person participates.   
While faith communities are often the first community that comes to mind when dealing 
with formation, other communities need to be aware of this need for integration.  The formation 
of conscience, as stated earlier, occurs within the community.  Work communities are a potential 
area for promoting the integrated life, as it is a place that most people voluntarily associate with.  
These work communities would also see a benefit from promoting an integrated life as an 
integrated formation program could possibly replace expensive, non-effective ethics manuals by 
getting to the root of the problem.  By promoting an integrated life in the workplace, employers 
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could spend less time micromanaging and more time giving employees the freedom they need to 
participate in the work community. 
Another potential area is though primary and secondary education.  By teaching and 
forming children about the integrated life, the educational community would promote integrated, 
future citizens.  While the formation would have to be tailored to the needs of growing children, 
it would be best to engrain these integrative habits early.  This integrative method is applicable to 
numerous communities; due to the limits of this thesis, the application of this method will have 
to be explored in the future. 
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CONCLUSION 
The journey towards an integrated life requires an awareness of our external environment 
and our inner sanctuary known as the conscience.  I began the analysis with a look at the human 
person.  In the first chapter, I presented an anthropologically-centered understanding of 
conscience, through the lens of Rahner’s thought.  Rahner guided the analysis by situating the 
starting point anthropologically and offered the view that human beings are all existentially 
graced.  Following from Rahner’s thought, I presented the definition of conscience through the 
Second Vatican Council’s Gaudium et Spes.  I expanded upon that definition by introducing a 
personalist view consistent with the spirit of the Second Vatican Council. 
 After beginning with the human person, I explored the environment in which the human 
person participates.  In the second chapter, I focused on the public environment in the United 
States.  The American political climate is characterized by liberalism, which has practically 
reduced the true freedom and dignity of the human person.  Under the liberal model, the 
supposedly neutral government has effectively become a moral arbiter.  To deal with this 
dilemma, I introduced alternatives such as communitarianism and the Second Vatican Council’s 
Declaration on Religious Freedom Dignitatis Humanae.  Robert Vischer’s proposal to use 
institutions as mediators of individual conscience promotes a bottom-up approach consistent 
with the definition of conscience set forth in chapter one and avoids the American government’s 
involvement in determining which conscience prevails. 
In light of the analysis of the theological basis of conscience and the legal and 
sociological environment in which relational conscience, Ignatian Spirituality provides a 
methodological and practical vehicle for exercising the conscience within the public sphere, even 
if the public sphere is not wholly welcoming to a faith-based conscience. 
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In the third chapter, I explained the suitability of Ignatian spirituality for the discussion 
on conscience.  While many methods of spirituality exist to help a person live an integrated life, 
Ignatian spirituality is most suitable in light of our analysis on conscience because it focuses on 
both the individual and the relational dimensions of conscience.  Using the concepts of Ignatian 
contemplation and discernment, the individual can listen to the stirrings of one’s heart through 
experience and other sources to determine the proper course of action.  The Ignatian concept of 
the “contemplative in action” connects the faculty of moral reasoning and judgment to action 
within the world, remaining consistent with the model that Vischer proposed. 
Remaining aware of one’s inner stirrings and how to make choices based on those inner 
stirrings are important because it is a means to living an integrated and free life.  While it may 
take an extra effort to be aware and to look back on the day to see where one could improve upon 
his or her actions, it is a worthy goal to be able to exercise our intrinsic faculty known as the 
conscience. 
The implications of the conversation between conscience, the public sphere, and Ignatian 
spirituality are numerous.  Although Ignatian spirituality originates from the Catholic tradition, 
its anthropological focus makes it accessible to the human person and overcomes the extrincism 
attributed to conscience.  Consistent with Vischer’s bottom up approach, the concepts of Ignatian 
spirituality allow the individual the freedom to choose the type of life he or she was created to 
live. 
Earlier I posed the question that I encountered daily in my work, which is “what should I 
do?”  In light of the analysis, the question should be answered with a recommendation first to be 
self-aware.  Because the answer depends on an individual’s context, self-awareness would be a 
way to grow an understanding of one’s context, including personal and religious beliefs, values, 
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and experiences.  Once a person understands himself or herself, he or she can make a decision on 
the basis of self-knowledge, which is at the core of truly listening to one’s conscience. 
This multidisciplinary synthesis does not propose to answer life’s most difficult questions 
in a few pages; however, it does propose the revolutionary nature of pausing to think about 
decisions before making those decisions.  A future application of the principles set forth to 
persons in a specific context would be a worthwhile project.  While I may not have answered the 
question, “what should I do?,” framing what is important to consider in responding to that 
question reveals a wealth of wisdom to the person who is seeking to live a life of integrity.  I 
have highlighted not only the areas in which a person may not have control of a situation, but 
also the areas where a person has the freedom to live a life integrated with his or her conscience.  
It is through this lens that one truly changes the world by responding to and integrating his or her 
public life with the inner voice of his or her conscience. 
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